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Abstract. We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer
preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and
lecturers (spa-st). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this context. Informally,
a matching is strongly stable if there is no student and lecturer l such that if they decide
to form a private arrangement outside of the matching via one of l’s proposed projects,
then neither party would be worse off and at least one of them would strictly improve.
We describe the first polynomial-time algorithm to find a strongly stable matching or to
report that no such matching exists, given an instance of spa-st. Our algorithm runs in
O(m2) time, where m is the total length of the students’ preference lists.
Keywords: student-project allocation problem, indifference, strongly stable matching,
polynomial-time algorithm
1 Introduction
Matching problems, which generally involve the assignment of a set of agents to another set
of agents based on preferences, have wide applications in many real-world settings, including,
for example, allocating junior doctors to hospitals [25] and assigning students to projects [16].
In the context of assigning students to projects, each project is proposed by one lecturer and
each student is required to provide a preference list over the available projects that she finds
acceptable. Also, lecturers may provide a preference list over the students that find their projects
acceptable, and/or over the projects that they propose. Typically, each project and lecturer have
a specific capacity denoting the maximum number of students that they can accommodate. The
goal is to find a matching, i.e., an assignment of students to projects that respects the stated
preferences, such that each student is assigned at most one project, and the capacity constraints
on projects and lecturers are not violated — the so-called Student-Project Allocation problem
(spa) [1,6,20].
Two major models of spa exist in the literature: one permits preferences only from the stu-
dents [16], while the other permits preferences from the students and lecturers [1,15]. In the latter
case, three different variants have been studied based on the nature of the lecturers’ preference
lists. These include SPA with lecturer preferences over (i) students [15], (ii) projects [13,22,23],
and (iii) (student, project) pairs [2]. Outwith assigning students to projects, applications of each
of these three variants can be seen in multi-cell networks where the goal is to find a stable
assignment of users to channels at base-stations [3,4,5].
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2In this work, we will concern ourselves with variant (i), i.e., the Student-Project Allocation
problem with lecturer preferences over Students (spa-s). In this context, it has been argued in
[25] that a natural property for a matching to satisfy is that of stability. Informally, a stable
matching ensures that no student and lecturer would have an incentive to deviate from their
current assignment. Abraham et al. [1] described two linear-time algorithms to find a stable
matching in an instance of spa-s where the preference lists are strictly ordered. In their paper,
they also proposed an extension of spa-s where the preference lists may include ties, which we
refer to as the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students with
Ties (spa-st).
If we allow ties in the preference lists of students and lecturers, three different stability
definitions are possible [9,10,11]. We give an informal definition in what follows. Suppose that
M is a matching in an instance of spa-st. Then M is (i) weakly stable, (ii) strongly stable, or
(iii) super-stable, if there is no student and lecturer l such that if they decide to become assigned
outside of M via one of l’s proposed projects, respectively,
(i) both of them would strictly improve,
(ii) one of them would be better off, and the other would not be worse off
(iii) neither of them would be worse off.
These concepts were first defined and studied by Irving [9] in the context of the Stable Marriage
problem with Ties (smt) (the restriction of spa-st in which each lecturer offers only one project,
the capacity of each project and lecturer is 1, the numbers of students and lecturers are equal,
each student finds all projects acceptable, and each lecturer finds all students acceptable). It
was subsequently extended to the Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (HRT) [10,11] (where
HRT is the special case of spa-st in which each lecturer offers only one project, and the capacity
of each project is the same as the capacity of the lecturer offering the project).
Existing results in spa-st. Every instance of spa-st admits a weakly stable matching, which
could be of different sizes [21]. Moreover, the problem of finding a maximum size weakly stable
matching (MAX-SPA-ST) is NP-hard [12,21], even for the so-called Stable Marriage problem with
Ties and Incomplete lists (smti). Cooper andManlove [7] described a 32 -approximation algorithm
for MAX-SPA-ST. On the other hand, Irving et al. argued in [10] that super-stability is a natural
and most robust solution concept to seek in cases where agents have incomplete information.
Recently, Olaosebikan and Manlove [24] showed that if an instance of spa-st admits a super-
stable matching M , then all weakly stable matchings in the instance are of the same size (equal
to the size ofM), and match exactly the same set of students. The main result of their paper was
a polynomial-time algorithm to find a super-stable matching or report that no such matching
exists, given an instance of spa-st. Their algorithm runs in O(L) time, where L is the total
length of all the preference lists.
Motivation. It was motivated in [11] that weakly stable matching may be undermined by
bribery or persuasion, in practical applications of hrt. In what follows, we give a corresponding
argument for an instance I of spa-st. Suppose that M is a weakly stable matching in I, and
suppose that a student si prefers a project pj (where pj is offered by lecturer lk) to her assigned
project in M , say pj′ (where pj′ is offered by a lecturer different from lk). Suppose further
that pj is full and lk is indifferent between si and one of the worst student/s assigned to pj in
M , say si′ . Clearly, the pair (si, pj) does not constitute a blocking pair for the weakly stable
matching M , as lk would not improve by taking on si in the place of si′ . However, si might be
overly invested in pj that she is even ready to persuade or even bribe lk to reject si′ and accept
her instead; lk being indifferent between si and si′ may decide to accept si’s proposal. We can
reach a similar argument if the roles are reversed. However, if M is strongly stable, it cannot be
potentially undermined by this type of (student, project) pair.
3Henceforth, if a spa-st instance admits a strongly stable matching, we say that such an
instance is solvable. Unfortunately not every instance of spa-st is solvable. To see this, consider
the case where there are two students, two projects and two lecturers, the capacity of each
project and lecturer is 1, the students have exactly the same strictly ordered preference list of
length 2, and each of the lecturers preference list is a single tie of length 2 (any matching will
be undermined by a student and lecturer that are not matched together). However, it should be
clear from the discussions above that in cases where a strongly stable matching exists, it should
be preferred over a matching that is merely weakly stable.
Related work. The following are previous results for strong stability in the literature. Irving [9]
gave an O(n4) algorithm for computing strongly stable matchings in an instance of smt, where
n is the number of men (equal to the number of women). This algorithm was subsequently
extended by Manlove [19] to instances of smti, which is a generalisation of smt for which the
preference lists need not be complete. The extended algorithm also has running time O(n4).
Irving et al. [11] described an algorithm to find a strongly stable matching or report that no
such matching exists, given an instance of HRT. The algorithm has running time O(m2), where
m is the total number of acceptable (resident, hospital) pairs. Subsequently, Kavitha et al. [14]
presented two strong stability algorithms with improved running time; one for smti with running
time O(nm), where n is the number of vertices and m is the number of edges, and the other for
hrt with running time O(m
∑
h∈H ph), where H is the set of all hospitals and ph is the capacity
of a hospital h. These two algorithms build on the ones described in [9,11,19]. A recent result
in strong stability is the work of Kunysz [17], where he described an O(nm log(Wn)) algorithm
for computing a maximum weight strongly stable matching given an instance of smti, where W
is the maximum weight of an edge.
Our contribution. We present the first polynomial-time algorithm to find a strongly stable
matching or report that no such matching exists, given an instance of spa-st – thus solving
an open problem given in [1,24]. Our algorithm is student-oriented, which implies that if the
given instance is solvable then our algorithm will output a solution in which each student has
at least as good a project as she could obtain in any strongly stable matching. We note that our
algorithm is a non-trivial extension of the strong stability algorithms for smt [9], smti [19], and
hrt [11] (we discuss this further in Sect. 4.3).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We give a formal definition of the spa-s
problem, the spa-st variant, and the three stability concepts in Sect. 2. We give some intuition
for the strong stability definition in Sect. 3. We describe our algorithm for spa-st under strong
stability in Sect. 4. Further, in Sect. 4, we also illustrate an execution of our algorithm with
respect to an instance of spa-st before moving on to present the algorithm’s correctness and
complexity results, along with proof of correctness. Finally, we present some potential direction
for future work in Sect. 5.
2 Preliminary definitions
In this section, we give a formal definition of spa-s as described in the literature [1]. We also give
a formal definition of spa-st — a generalisation of spa-s in which preference lists can include
ties.
2.1 Formal definition of spa-s
An instance I of spa-s involves a set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn1} of students, a set P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn2}
of projects and a set L = {l1, l2, . . . , ln3} of lecturers. Each student si ranks a subset of P in
4strict order, which forms her preference list. We say that si finds pj acceptable if pj appears on
si’s preference list. We denote by Ai the set of projects that si finds acceptable.
Each lecturer lk ∈ L offers a non-empty set of projects Pk, where P1, P2, . . . , Pn3 partitions
P , and lk provides a preference list, denoted by Lk, ranking in strict order of preference those
students who find at least one project in Pk acceptable. Also lk has a capacity dk ∈ Z+, indicating
the maximum number of students she is willing to supervise. Similarly each project pj ∈ P has
a capacity cj ∈ Z
+ indicating the maximum number of students that it can accommodate.
We assume that for any lecturer lk, max{cj : pj ∈ Pk} ≤ dk ≤
∑
{cj : pj ∈ Pk} (i.e., the
capacity of lk is (i) at least the highest capacity of the projects offered by lk, and (ii) at most the
sum of the capacities of all the projects lk is offering). We denote by L
j
k, the projected preference
list of lecturer lk for pj , which can be obtained from Lk by removing those students that do not
find pj acceptable (thereby retaining the order of the remaining students from Lk).
An assignment M is a subset of S × P such that (si, pj) ∈ M implies that si finds pj
acceptable. If (si, pj) ∈M , we say that si is assigned to pj , and pj is assigned si. For convenience,
if si is assigned in M to pj , where pj is offered by lk, we may also say that si is assigned to lk,
and lk is assigned si. For any project pj ∈ P , we denote byM(pj) the set of students assigned to
pj in M . Project pj is undersubscribed, full or oversubscribed according as |M(pj)| is less than,
equal to, or greater than cj , respectively. Similarly, for any lecturer lk ∈ L, we denote by M(lk)
the set of students assigned to lk in M . Lecturer lk is undersubscribed, full or oversubscribed
according as |M(lk)| is less than, equal to, or greater than dk, respectively. A matching M is
an assignment such that |M(si)| ≤ 1, |M(pj)| ≤ cj and |M(lk)| ≤ dk. If si is assigned to some
project in M , for convenience we let M(si) denote that project.
2.2 Ties in the preference lists
We now give a formal definition, similar to the one given in [24], for the generalisation of spa-s
in which the preference lists can include ties. In the preference list of lecturer lk ∈ L, a set T
of r students forms a tie of length r if lk does not prefer si to si′ for any si, si′ ∈ T (i.e., lk
is indifferent between si and si′). A tie in a student’s preference list is defined similarly. For
convenience, in what follows we consider a non-tied entry in a preference list as a tie of length
one. We denote by spa-st the generalisation of spa-s in which the preference list of each student
(respectively lecturer) comprises a strict ranking of ties, each comprising one or more projects
(respectively students). An example spa-st instance I1 is given in Fig. 1, which involves the
set of students S = {s1, s2, s3}, the set of projects P = {p1, p2, p3} and the set of lecturers
L = {l1, l2}. Ties in the preference lists are indicated by round brackets.
Student preferences Lecturer preferences
s1: (p1 p2) l1: s3 (s1 s2) l1 offers p1, p2
s2: p2 p3 l2: (s3 s2) l2 offers p3
s3: p3 p1
Project capacities: c1 = c2 = c3 = 1
Lecturer capacities: d1 = 2, d2 = 1
Fig. 1: An example spa-st instance I1.
In the context of spa-st, we assume that all notation and terminology carries over from spa-
s with the exception of stability, which we now define. When ties appear in the preference lists,
three types of stability arise, namely weak stability, strong stability and super-stability [10,11].
5In what follows, we give a formal definition of these three stability concepts in the context of
spa-st. Henceforth, I is an instance of spa-st, (si, pj) is an acceptable pair in I and lk is the
lecturer who offers pj.
Definition 1 (weak stability [7]). LetM be a matching in I. We say thatM is weakly stable if
it admits no blocking pair, where a blocking pair ofM is an acceptable pair (si, pj) ∈ (S×P)\M
such that (a) and (b) holds as follows:
(a) either si is unassigned in M or si prefers pj to M(si);
(b) either (i), (ii), or (iii) holds as follows:
(i) pj is undersubscribed and lk is undersubscribed;
(ii) pj is undersubscribed, lk is full and either si ∈ M(lk), or lk prefers si to the worst
student/s in M(lk);
(iii) pj is full and lk prefers si to the worst student/s in M(pj).
Definition 2 (super-stability [24]). We say that M is super-stable if it admits no blocking
pair, where a blocking pair of M is an acceptable pair (si, pj) ∈ (S × P) \M such that (a) and
(b) holds as follows:
(a) either si is unassigned in M , or si prefers pj to M(si) or is indifferent between them;
(b) either (i), (ii), or (iii) holds as follows:
(i) pj is undersubscribed and lk is undersubscribed;
(ii) pj is undersubscribed, lk is full, and either si ∈ M(lk) or lk prefers si to the worst
student/s in M(lk) or is indifferent between them;
(iii) pj is full and lk prefers si to the worst student/s in M(pj) or is indifferent between
them.
Definition 3 (strong stability). We say thatM is strongly stable in I if it admits no blocking
pair, where a blocking pair of M is an acceptable pair (si, pj) ∈ (S × P) \M such that either
(1a and 1b) or (2a and 2b) holds as follows:
(1a) either si is unassigned in M , or si prefers pj to M(si);
(1b) either (i), (ii), or (iii) holds as follows:
(i) pj is undersubscribed and lk is undersubscribed;
(ii) pj is undersubscribed, lk is full, and either si ∈ M(lk) or lk prefers si to the worst
student/s in M(lk) or is indifferent between them;
(iii) pj is full and lk prefers si to the worst student/s in M(pj) or is indifferent between
them.
(2a) si is indifferent between pj and M(si);
(2b) either (i), (ii), or (iii) holds as follows:
(i) pj is undersubscribed, lk is undersubscribed and si /∈M(lk);
(ii) pj is undersubscribed, lk is full, si /∈M(lk), and lk prefers si to the worst student/s in
M(lk);
(iii) pj is full and lk prefers si to the worst student/s in M(pj).
In the remainder of this paper, any usage of the term blocking pair refers to the version of
this term for strong stability as defined in Definition 3. We give an intuition behind the strong
stability definition is what follows.
63 Justification of the strong stability definition
It should be clear from our definition of a blocking pair (si, pj) that if si seeks to become assigned
to pj outside ofM , then at most one of si and lk can be indifferent to the switch, whilst at least
one of them must strictly improve. In what follows, we justify our definition in more detail (we
remark that some of the argument is similar to that given for the blocking pair definition in the
spa-s case [1, Sect 2.2]).
We consider the first part of the definition. In Definition 3(1a); clearly if the assignment
between si and pj is permitted, si will improve relative to M . Now, let us consider lk’s perspec-
tive. In Definition 3(1b)(i), lk will be willing to take on si for pj, since there is a free space. In
Definition 3(1b)(ii), if si was already assigned in M to a project offered by lk then lk will agree
to the switch, since the total number of students assigned to lk remains the same. However,
if si was not already assigned in M to a project offered by lk, since lk is full, lk will need to
reject some student assigned to her in order to take on si. Obviously, lk will not reject a student
that she prefers to si; thus lk will either improve or be no worse off after the switch. Finally,
in Definition 3(1b)(iii), since pj is full, lk will need to reject some student assigned to pj in
order to take on si. Again, lk will either improve or be no worse off after the switch. Under this
definition, as observed in [1, Sect 2.2], if si was already assigned in M to a project offered by lk,
then the number of students assigned to lk will decrease by 1 (the reason for this was further
justified in [1, Sect 6.1]).
Next, we consider the second part of the definition. In Definition 3(2a), if the assignment
between si and pj is permitted, clearly si will be no worse off after the switch. Again, we consider
lk’s perspective (we note that in this case, lk must improve after the switch.). In Definition
3(2b)(i), if pj and lk is undersubscribed, then the only way that lk would improve is if si is not
already assigned in M to a project offered by lk. If this is the case, then lk will agree to the
switch since there is a free space and she will get one more student to supervise, namely si. In
Definition 3(2b)(ii), if pj is undersubscribed and lk is full, the only way lk could improve is first
for si to not be assigned in M to a project offered by lk. If this is the case then lk will need to
reject some student assigned to her in M in order to take on si. Obviously, lk will be willing to
reject a student that is worse than si on her list. Similarly, in Definition 3(2b)(iii), if pj is full
in M , lk will need to reject some student assigned to pj in M in order to take on si. Clearly, lk
must prefer si to such student so that lk can have a better set of students assigned to pj after
the switch. We remark that if si is already assigned in M to a project offered by lk, the number
of students assigned to lk in M will decrease by 1 after the switch.
We illustrate this using the example spa-st instance I2 in Fig. 2. Clearly, M1 = {(s1, p2),
(s2, p1)} is a matching in I2. However, by satisfying the blocking pair (s1, p1), we obtain the
matching M2 = {(s1, p1)}, which is strongly stable. In going from M1 to M2, lecturer l1 got a
better student to take on p1, with l1 having to lose one student, namely s2. Following a similar
argument as in [1, Sect 6.1] for the spa-s case, in practice, l1 might not agree to take on s1 for
p1, since in doing so l1 loses a student. So, one could relax Definition 3(2b)(iii) to prevent such
change from happening. Further, we argue that this could lead to two new problems.
1. We introduce an element of strategy into the problem by allowing a matching such as M1
to be strongly stable. That is, a student could provide a shorter preference list in order to
obtain a more suitable project. To illustrate this, suppose that s1 has only listed p1 in the
example instance I2. Irrespective of how we relax Definition 3(2b)(iii), si would be assigned
to p1. However, this strategy might not be beneficial for a student in all cases, since by not
listing all of her acceptable projects, a student is at risk of not being assigned in the final
strongly stable matching.
7Student preferences Lecturer preferences
s1: (p1 p2) l1: s1 s2 l1 offers p1, p2
s2: p1
Project capacities: c1 = c2 = 1
Lecturer capacities: d1 = 2
Fig. 2: An example spa-st instance I2.
2. If we allow both M1 and M2 to be strongly stable, this would imply that the instance
admits strongly stable matchings of different sizes. Hence, we would seek a maximum size
strongly stable matching in order to match as many students to projects as possible. However,
we conjecture that this problem is NP-hard, following from related problems of finding
maximum size stable matching in the literature.
4 An algorithm for spa-st under strong stability
In this section we present our algorithm for spa-st under strong stability, which we will refer to
as Algorithm SPA-ST-strong. In Sect. 4.1, we give some definitions relating to the algorithm.
In Sect. 4.2, we give a description of our algorithm and present it in pseudocode form. In
Sect. 4.3, we briefly describe the non-trivial modifications that are involved in extending the
existing strong stability algorithms for smt [9], smti [19] and hrt [11] to our algorithm for the
spa-st case. We illustrate an execution of our algorithm with respect to a spa-st instance in
Sect. 4.4. Finally, in Sect. 4.5, we present our algorithm’s correctness results along with proof
of correctness.
4.1 Definitions relating to the algorithm
Given a pair (si, pj) ∈ M , for some strongly stable matching M in I, we call (si, pj) a strongly
stable pair. During the execution of the algorithm, students become provisionally assigned to
projects (and implicitly to lecturers), and it is possible for a project (and lecturer) to be provi-
sionally assigned a number of students that exceeds its capacity. We describe a project (respec-
tively lecturer) as replete if at any time during the execution of the algorithm it has been full or
oversubscribed. We say that a project (respectively lecturer) is non-replete if it is not replete.
As stated earlier, for a project pj , it is possible that dG(pj) > cj at some point during
the algorithm’s execution. Thus, we denote by qj = min{cj, dG(pj)} the quota of pj in G,
which is the minimum between pj ’s capacity and the number of students provisionally assigned
to pj in G. Similarly, for a lecturer lk, it is possible that dG(lk) > dk at some point during
the algorithm’s execution. At this point, we denote by αk =
∑
{qj : pj ∈ Pk ∩ P} the total
quota of projects offered by lk that is provisionally assigned to students in G and we denote by
qk = min{dk, dG(lk), αk} the quota of lk in G.
The algorithm proceeds by deleting from the preference lists certain (si, pj) pairs that are
not strongly stable. By the term delete (si, pj), we mean the removal of pj from si’s preference
list and the removal of si from L
j
k (the projected preference list of lecturer lk for pj); in addition,
if (si, pj) ∈ E we delete the edge from G. By the head and tail of a preference list at a given
point we mean the first and last tie respectively on that list after any deletions might have
occurred (recalling that a tie can be of length 1). Given a project pj , we say that a student
si is dominated in L
j
k if si is worse than at least cj students who are provisionally assigned to
pj . The concept of a student becoming dominated in a lecturer’s preference list is defined in a
slightly different manner.
8Definition 4 (Dominated in Lk). At a given point during the algorithm’s execution, let αk
and dG(lk) be as defined above. We say that a student si is dominated in Lk if min{dG(lk), αk} ≥
dk
1, and si is worse than at least dk students who are provisionally assigned in G to a project
offered by lk.
Definition 5 (Lower rank edge). We define an edge (si, pj) ∈ E as a lower rank edge if si is
in the tail of Lk and min{dG(lk), αk} > dk.
Definition 6 (Bound). Given an edge (si, pj) ∈ E, we say that si is bound to pj if (i) and (ii)
holds as follows:
(i) pj is not oversubscribed or si is not in the tail of L
j
k (or both);
(ii) (si, pj) is not a lower rank edge or si is not in the tail of Lk (or both).
If si is bound to pj , we may also say that (si, pj) is a bound edge. Otherwise, we refer to it as
an unbound edge.2
We form a reduced assignment graph Gr = (Sr, Pr, Er) from a provisional assignment graph G
as follows. For each edge (si, pj) ∈ E such that si is bound to pj , we remove the edge (si, pj)
from Gr
3 and we reduce the quota of pj in Gr (and intuitively lk
4) by one. Further, we remove
all other unbound edges incident to si in Gr. Each isolated student vertex is then removed from
Gr. Finally, if the quota of any project is reduced to 0, or pj becomes an isolated vertex, then pj
is removed from Gr. For each surviving pj in Gr, we denote by q
∗
j the revised quota of pj , where
q∗j is the difference between pj ’s quota in G (i.e., qj) and the number of students that are bound
to pj . Similarly, we denote by q
∗
k the revised quota of lk in Gr, where q
∗
k is the difference between
lk’s quota in G (i.e., qk) and the number of students that are bound to a project offered by lk.
Further, for each lk who offers at least one project in Gr, we let n =
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ Pk ∩Pr}− q
∗
k,
where n is the difference between the total revised quota of projects in Gr that are offered by
lk and the revised quota of lk in Gr. Now, if n ≤ 0, we do nothing; otherwise, we extend Gr as
follows. We add n dummy student vertices to Sr. For each of these dummy vertex, say sdi , and
for each project pj ∈ Pk ∩ Pr that is adjacent to a student vertex in Sr via a lower rank edge,
we add the edge (sdi , pj) to Er.
5
Given a set X ⊆ Sr of students, define N (X), the neighbourhood of X , to be the set of
project vertices adjacent in Gr to a student in X . If for all subsets X of Sr, each student in X
can be assigned to one project in N (X), without exceeding the revised quota of each project
in N (X) (i.e., |X | ≤
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ N (X)} for all X ⊆ Sr); then we say Gr admits a perfect
matching that saturates Sr.
Definition 7 (Critical set). It is well known in the literature [18] that if Gr does not admit
a perfect matching that saturates Sr, then there must exist a deficient subset Z ⊆ Sr such that
|Z| >
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ N (Z)}. To be precise, the deficiency of Z is defined by δ(Z) = |Z| −
∑
{q∗j :
1 If a student si is provisionally assigned in G to two different projects offered by lk then, potentially,
dG(lk) < αk. Thus, it is important that we take the minimum of these two parameters, to avoid
deleting strongly stable pairs.
2 An edge (si, pj) ∈ E can change state from bound to unbound, but not vice versa.
3 We note that we only remove this edge to form Gr, we do not delete the edge from G.
4 If si is bound to more than one projects offered by lk, for all the bound edges involving si and these
projects that we remove from Gr, we only reduce lk’s quota in Gr by one.
5 An intuition as to why we add dummy students to Gr is as follows. Given a lecturer lk whose project
is provisionally assigned to a student in Gr. If q
∗
k <
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ Pk ∩ Pr}, then we need n dummy
students to offset the difference between
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ Pk ∩Pr} and q
∗
k, so that we don’t oversubscribe
lk in any maximum matching obtained from Gr.
9pj ∈ N (Z)}. The deficiency of Gr, denoted δ(Gr), is the maximum deficiency taken over all
subsets of Sr. Thus, if δ(Z) = δ(Gr), we say that Z is a maximally deficient subset of Sr, and
we refer to Z as a critical set.
We denote by PR the set of replete projects in G and we denote by P
∗
R a subset of projects in
PR which is obtained as follows. For each project pj ∈ PR, let lk be the lecturer who offers pj .
For each student si such that (si, pj) has been deleted, we add pj to P
∗
R if (i) and (ii) holds as
follows:
(i) either si is unassigned in G, or (si, pj′) ∈ G where si prefers pj to pj′ , or (si, pj′) ∈ G and
si is indifferent between pj and pj′ where pj′ /∈ Pk;
(ii) either lk is undersubscribed, or lk is full and either si ∈ G(lk) or lk prefers si to some
student assigned in G(lk).
Definition 8 (Feasible matching). A feasible matching in the final provisional assignment
graph G is a matching M which is obtained as follows:
1. Let G∗ be the subgraph of G induced by the students who are adjacent to a project in P ∗R.
First, find a maximum matching M∗ in G∗;6
2. Using M∗ as an initial solution, find a maximum matching M in G.
4.2 Description of the algorithm
Algorithm SPA-ST-strong, described in Algorithm 1, begins by initialising an empty bipartite
graph G which will contain the provisional assignments of students to projects (and intuitively
to lecturers). We remark that such assignments (i.e., edges in G) can subsequently be broken
during the algorithm’s execution.
The while loop of the algorithm involves each student si who is not adjacent to any project
in G and who has a non-empty list applying in turn to each project pj at the head of her
list. Immediately, si becomes provisionally assigned to pj in G (and to lk). If, by gaining a new
provisional assignee, project pj becomes full or oversubscribed then we set pj as replete. Further,
for each student st in L
j
k, such that st is dominated in L
j
k, we delete the pair (st, pj). As we will
prove later, such pairs cannot belong to any strongly stable matching. Similarly, if by gaining a
new provisional assignee, lk becomes full or oversubscribed then we set lk as replete. For each
student st in Lk, such that st is dominated in Lk and for each project pu ∈ Pk that st finds
acceptable, we delete the pair (st, pu). This continues until every student is provisionally assigned
to one or more projects or has an empty list. At the point where the while loop terminates, we
form the reduced assignment graph Gr and we find the critical set Z of students in Gr (Lemma
3 describes how to find Z). As we will see later, no project pj ∈ N (Z) can be assigned to any
student in the tail of Ljk in any strongly stable matching, so all such pairs are deleted.
At the termination of the inner repeat-until loop in line 21, i.e., when Z is empty, if some
project pj that is replete ends up undersubscribed, we let sr be any one of the most preferred
students (according to Ljk) who was provisionally assigned to pj during some iteration of the
algorithm but is not assigned to pj at this point (for convenience, we henceforth refer to such
sr as the most preferred student rejected from pj according to L
j
k). If the students at the tail of
Lk (recalling that the tail of Lk is the least-preferred tie in Lk after any deletions might have
occurred) are no better than sr, it turns out that none of these students st can be assigned to any
6 At the point in the algorithm when we need to construct the feasible matching M from G, if P ∗R is
non-empty, this phase ensures that we fill up all of the projects in P ∗R to avoid a potential blocking
pair involving some student that has been rejected by some project in P ∗R.
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project offered by lk in any strongly stable matching – such pairs (st, pu), for each project pu ∈ Pk
that st finds acceptable, are deleted. The repeat-until loop is then potentially reactivated,
and the entire process continues until every student is provisionally assigned to a project or has
an empty list.
At the termination of the outer repeat-until loop in line 30, if a student is adjacent in G to
a project pj via a bound edge, then we may potentially carry out extra deletions as follows. First,
we let lk be the lecturer that offers pj and we let U be the set of projects that are adjacent to si
in G via an unbound edge. For each project pu ∈ U \Pk, it turns out that the pair (si, pu) cannot
belong to any strongly stable matching, thus we delete all such pairs. Finally, we let M be any
feasible matching in the provisional assignment graph G. If M is strongly stable relative to the
given instance I then M is output as a strongly stable matching in I. Otherwise, the algorithm
reports that no strongly stable matching exists in I. We present Algorithm SPA-ST-strong in
pseudocode form in Algorithm 1.
Finding the critical set. Consider the reduced assignment graph Gr = (Sr, Pr, Er) formed
from G at a given point during the algorithm’s execution (at line 15). To find the critical set of
students in Gr, first we need to construct a maximum matching Mr in Gr, with respect to the
revised quota q∗j , for each pj ∈ Pr. In this context, a matching Mr ⊆ Er is such that |Mr(si)| ≤ 1
for all si ∈ Sr, and |Mr(pj)| ≤ q∗j for all pj ∈ Pr. We describe how to construct Mr as follows:
1. Let G′r be the subgraph of Gr induced by the dummy students adjacent to a project in Gr.
First, find a maximum matching M ′r in G
′
r.
2. Using M ′r as an initial solution, find a maximum matching Mr in Gr.
7
If a student si is not assigned to any project inMr, we say that vertex si is free in Gr. Similarly,
if a project pj is such that pj has fewer than q
∗
j assignees in Mr, we say that vertex pj is free in
Gr. An alternating path in Gr relative to Mr is any simple path in which edges are alternately
in, and not in, Mr. An augmenting path in Gr is an alternating path from a free student to a
free project. The following lemmas are classical results with respect to matchings in bipartite
graphs.
Lemma 1. A matching Mr in a reduced assignment graph Gr has maximum cardinality if and
only if there is no augmenting path relative to Mr in Gr.
Lemma 2. Let Mr be a maximum matching in the reduced assignment graph Gr. Then |Mr| =
|Sr| − δ(Gr).
The classical augmenting path algorithm can be used to obtainMr, and as explained in [11],
this can be implemented to run in O(min{n,
∑
cj}m) time, where n is the number of students
and m is the total length of the students’ preference lists. Now that we have described how to
construct a maximum matching in the reduced assignment graph, the following lemma tells us
how to find the critical set of students.
Lemma 3. Given a maximum matching Mr in the reduced assignment graph Gr, the critical
set Z consists of the set U of unassigned students together with the set U ′ of students reachable
from a student in U via an alternating path.
7 By making sure that all the dummy students are matched in step 1, we are guaranteed that no
lecturer is oversubscribed with non-dummy students in Gr.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm SPA-ST-strong
Input: spa-st instance I
Output: a strongly stable matching in I or “no strongly stable matching exists in I”
1: G← ∅
2: repeat
3: repeat
4: while some student si is unassigned and has a non-empty list do
5: for each project pj at the head of si’s list do
6: lk ← lecturer who offers pj
7: add the edge (si, pj) to G
8: if pj is full or oversubscribed then
9: for each student st dominated in L
j
k do
10: delete (st, pj)
11: if lk is full or oversubscribed then
12: for each student st dominated in Lk do
13: for each project pu ∈ Pk ∩ At do
14: delete (st, pu)
15: form the reduced assignment graph Gr
16: find the critical set Z of students
17: for each project pu ∈ N (Z) do
18: lk ← lecturer who offers pu
19: for each student st at the tail of L
u
k do
20: delete (st, pu)
21: until Z is empty
22: for each pj ∈ P do
23: if pj is replete and pj is undersubscribed then
24: lk ← lecturer who offers pj
25: sr ← most preferred student rejected from pj in L
j
k {any if > 1}
26: if the students at the tail of Lk are no better than sr then
27: for each student st at the tail of Lk do
28: for each project pu ∈ Pk ∩ At do
29: delete (st, pu)
30: until every unassigned student has an empty list
31: for each student si in G do
32: if si is adjacent in G to a project pj via a bound edge then
33: lk ← lecturer who offers pj
34: U ← unbound projects adjacent to si in G
35: for each pu ∈ U \ Pk do
36: delete (si, pu)
37: M ← a feasible matching in G
38: if M is a strongly stable matching in I then
39: return M
40: else
41: return “no strongly stable matching exists in I”
Proof. First, we note that δ(Gr) = |U |. Let C = U ∪ U ′, we claim that δ(C) = |U |. By the
definition of δ(Gr), clearly δ(C) ≤ δ(Gr) = |U |. Now suppose that δ(C) < |U |, then
|U | > δ(C)
= |U ∪ U ′| −
∑
pj∈N (C)
q∗j
= |U |+ |U ′| −
∑
pj∈N (C)
q∗j (since U ∩ U
′ = ∅)
|U ′| <
∑
pj∈N (C)
q∗j . (1)
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Inequality 1 implies that there is a project pj ∈ N (C) such that pj has fewer than q∗j assignees
in Mr; thus pj is free in Mr. We claim that every student that is assigned in Gr to a project
pj′ ∈ N (C) must be in C. For suppose there is a student si /∈ C such that si is assigned to pj′
in Mr. Since pj′ ∈ N (C), then pj′ must be adjacent to some student si′ ∈ C. Now, if si′ ∈ U ,
then there is an alternating path from si′ to si via pj′ , a contradiction. Otherwise, if si′ ∈ U ′,
since si′ is reachable from a student in U via an alternating path, si is also reachable from the
same student in U via an alternating path. Hence our claim is established. Now, given that pj
has fewer than q∗j assignees in Mr, since each student in U
′ is reachable from a student in U via
an alternating path, and the students in U ∪U ′ are collectively adjacent to projects in N (C), we
can find an alternating path from a student in U to pj . Thus Mr admits an augmenting path,
contradicting the maximality of Mr.
Further, the critical set Z must contain every student who is unassigned in some maximum
matching in Gr. For, suppose not. Let M
∗
r be an arbitrary such matching (where |M
∗
r | =
|Sr| − δ(Gr)), and suppose there is some student si ∈ Sr \ Z such that si is unassigned in M∗r .
There must be δ(Gr) unassigned students, with at most δ(Gr) − 1 of these students contained
in Z (since si /∈ Z). Hence Z contains at least |Z| − δ(Gr) + 1 assigned students. It follows that
∑
pj∈N (Z)
q∗j ≥ |Z| − δ(Gr) + 1
or
|Z| −
∑
pj∈N (Z)
q∗j ≤ δ(Gr)− 1
contradicting the required deficiency of Z.
But, for every si ∈ U
′, there is a maximum matching in which si is unassigned, obtainable
fromMr via an alternating path from a student in U to si. Hence C ⊆ Z; and since δ(C) = δ(Z),
this completes the proof. ⊓⊔
4.3 The non-triviality of extending Algorithm HRT-strong to spa-st
Algorithm SPA-ST-strong is a non-trivial extension of Algorithm HRT-strong for hrt [11].
Here we outline the major distinctions between our algorithm and Algorithm HRT-strong,
which indicate the challenges involved in extending the earlier approach to the spa-st setting.
1. Given a lecturer lk, it is possible that during some iteration of our algorithm, some pj ∈ Pk
is oversubscribed which causes lk to become full or oversubscribed (see Fig. 4(a) in Sect. 4.4,
at the point where s3 applies to p1). Finding the dominated students in Lk becomes more
complex in spa-st – to achieve this we introduced the notion of quota (i.e., qk) for lk.
2. To form Gr in the spa-st case, we extended the approach described in the hrt case [11]
by introducing the concept of lower rank edges for each lecturer who offers a project in Gr,
and we also introduced dummy students.
3. Lines 22 - 29 of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong refer to additional deletions that must be car-
ried out in a certain situation; this type of deletion was also carried out in Algorithm
SPA-ST-super for super-stability [24] (see the description corresponding to Fig. 5 in Sect. 4.4
for an example showing why we may need to carry out this type of deletion in the strong
stability context).
4. Constructing a feasible matchingM in G in the spa-st setting is much more challenging: we
first identify some replete projects that must be full inM , denoted by P ∗R (see the description
corresponding to Fig. 6 in Sect. 4.4). Also, in the hrt case, when constructing M from G,
preference is given to a bound edge over an unbound edge; in general, this is not always true
in the spa-st case.
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4.4 Example algorithm execution
In this section, we illustrate an execution of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong with respect to the
spa-st instance I3 shown in Fig. 3, which involves the set of students S = {si : 1 ≤ i ≤ 8},
the set of projects P = {pj : 1 ≤ j ≤ 6} and the set of lecturers L = {lk : 1 ≤ k ≤ 3}. The
algorithm starts by initialising the bipartite graph G = {}, which will contain the provisional
assignment of students to projects. We assume that the students become provisionally assigned
to each project at the head of their list in subscript order. Figs. 4, 5 and 6 illustrate how this
execution of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong proceeds with respect to I3.
Student preferences Lecturer preferences offers
s1: p1 p6 {3} l1: s8 s7 (s1 s2 s3) (s4 s5) s6 p1, p2
s2: p1 p2 {2} l2: s6 s5 (s7 s3) p3, p4
s3: (p1 p4) {3} l3: (s1 s4) s8 p5, p6
s4: p2 (p5 p6)
s5: (p2 p3)
s6: (p2 p4)
s7: p3 p1 Project capacities: c1 = c2 = c6 = 2, c3 = c4 = c5 = 1
s8: p5 p1 Lecturer capacities: d1 = d3 = 3, d2 = 2
Fig. 3: An instance I3 of spa-st.
p1 : 2
p2 : 2
p3 : 1
p4 : 1
p5 : 1
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
s6
s7
s8
(a) The provisional as-
signment graph G(1) at
the end of the while
loop, with the quota of
each project labelled be-
side it.
p1 : 1
p2 : 2
s1
s2
s3
s4
sd1
(b) The reduced assign-
ment graph G
(1)
r , with
the revised quota of each
project labelled beside
it. The collection of the
dashed edges is the maxi-
mum matching M
(1)
r .
p1 : 1
p2 : 2
p3 : 1
p4 : 1
p5 : 1
s4
s5
s6
s7
s8
(c) The provisional as-
signment graph G(1) at
the termination of itera-
tion (1).
Fig. 4: Iteration (1).
Iteration 1: At the termination of the while loop during the first iteration of the inner repeat-until
loop, every student, except s3, s6 and s7, is provisionally assigned to every project in the first
tie on their preference list. Edge (s3, p4) /∈ G(1) because (s3, p4) was deleted as a result of s6 be-
coming provisionally assigned to p4, causing s3 to be dominated in L
4
2. Also, edge (s6, p2) /∈ G
(1)
because (s6, p2) was deleted as a result of s4 becoming provisionally assigned to p2, causing s6
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to be dominated in L1 (at that point in the algorithm, min{dG(l1), α1} = min{4, 3} = 3 = d1
and s6 is worse than at least d1 students who are provisionally assigned to l1). Finally, edge
(s7, p3) /∈ G(1) because (s7, p3) was deleted as a result of s5 becoming provisionally assigned to
p5, causing s7 to be dominated in L32.
To form G
(1)
r , the bound edges (s5, p3), (s6, p4), (s7, p1) and (s8, p5) are removed from the
graph. We can verify that edges (s4, p2) and (s5, p2) are unbound, since they are lower rank
edges for l1. Also, since p1 is oversubscribed, and each of s1, s2 and s3 is at the tail of L
1
1, edges
(s1, p1), (s2, p1) and (s3, p1) are unbound. Further, the revised quota of l1 in G
(1)
r is 2, and the
total revised quota of projects offered by l1 (i.e., p1 and p2) is 3. Thus, we add one dummy
student vertex sd1 to G
1
r , and we add an edge between sd1 and p2 (since p2 is the only project
in G
(1)
r adjacent to a student in the tail of L1 via a lower rank edge). With respect to the
maximum matching M
(1)
r , it is clear that the critical set Z(1) = {s1, s2, s3}, thus we delete the
edges (s1, p1), (s2, p1) and (s3, p1) from G
(1); and the inner repeat-until loop is reactivated.
p1 : 1
p2 : 2
p3 : 1
p4 : 1
p5 : 1
p6 : 1
s1
s2
s4
s5
s6
s7
s8
(a) The provisional as-
signment graph G(2) at
the end of the while
loop.
p2 : 1s4
(b) The reduced assign-
ment graph G
(2)
r .
p1 : 1
p2 : 1
p3 : 1
p4 : 1
p5 : 1
p6 : 1
s1
s2
s5
s6
s7
s8
(c) The provisional as-
signment graph G(2) at
the termination of itera-
tion (2).
Fig. 5: Iteration (2).
Iteartion 2: At the beginning of this iteration, each of s1 and s2 is unassigned and has a non-
empty list; thus we add edges (s1, p6) and (s2, p2) to the provisional assignment graph obtained
at the termination of iteration (1) to form G
(2)
r . It can be verified that every edge in G
(2)
r ,
except (s4, p2) and (s5, p2), is a bound edge. Clearly, the critical set Z
(2) = ∅, thus the inner
repeat-until loop terminates. At this point, project p1, which was replete during iteration (1),
is undersubscribed in iteration (2). Moreover, the students at the tail of L1 (i.e., s4 and s5) are
no better than s3, where s3 is one of the most preferred students rejected from p1 according to
L11; thus we delete edges (s4, p2) and (s5, p2). The outer repeat-until loop is then reactivated
(since s4 is unassigned and has a non-empty list).
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p1 : 2
p2 : 1
p3 : 1
p4 : 1
p5 : 1
p6 : 2
s1
s2
s4
s5
s6
s7
s8
(a) The provisional as-
signment graph G(3) at
the end of the while
loop.
Fig. 6: Iteration (3).
Iteration 3: At the beginning of this iteration, the only student that is unassigned and has a
non-empty list is s4; thus we add edges (s4, p5) and (s4, p6) to the provisional assignment graph
obtained at the termination of iteration (2) to form G
(3)
r . The provisional assignment of s4 to
p5 led to p5 becoming oversubscribed; thus (s8, p5) is deleted (since s8 is dominated on L53).
Further, s8 becomes provisionally assigned to p1. It can be verified that all the edges in G
(3)
r are
bound edges. Moreover, the reduced assignment graph G
(3)
r = ∅.
Again, every unassigned students has an empty list. We also have that a project p2, which
was replete in iteration (2), is undersubscribed in iteration (3). However, no further deletion is
carried out in line 29 of the algorithm, since the student at the tail of L1 (i.e., s2) is better
than s4 and s5, where s4 and s5 are the most preferred students rejected from p2 according
to L21. Hence, the repeat-until loop terminates. We observe that P
∗
R = {p5}, since (s8, p5)
has been deleted, s8 prefers p5 to her provisional assignment in G and l3 is undersubscribed.
Thus we need to ensure p5 fills up in the feasible matching M constructed from G, so as to
avoid (s8, p5) from blocking M . Finally, the algorithm outputs the feasible matching M =
{(s1, p6), (s2, p2), (s4, p5), (s5, p3), (s6, p4), (s7, p1), (s8, p1)} as a strongly stable matching.
4.5 Correctness of the algorithm
We now present the following results regarding the correctness of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong.
The first of these results deals with the fact that no strongly stable pair is ever deleted during
the execution of the algorithm.
Lemma 4. If a pair (si, pj) is deleted during the execution of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong, then
(si, pj) does not belong to any strongly stable matching in I.
In order to prove Lemma 4, we present Lemmas 5, 6 and 7.
Lemma 5. If a pair (si, pj) is deleted within the inner repeat-until loop during the execution
of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong, then (si, pj) does not belong to any strongly stable matching in
I.
Proof. Suppose that (si, pj) is the first strongly stable pair to be deleted within the inner
repeat-until loop during an arbitrary execution E of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong. Let M∗ be
some strongly stable matching in which si is assigned to pj . Let lk be the lecturer who offers pj .
Suppose that G is the provisional assignment graph immediately after the deletion of (si, pj).
There are three cases to consider.
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1. Suppose that (si, pj) is deleted (in line 10) because some other student became provisionally
assigned to pj during E, causing pj to become full or oversubscribed, so that si is dominated
in Ljk. Since (si, pj) ∈ M
∗ \ G, there is some student, say sr, such that lk prefers sr to si
and (sr, pj) ∈ G \M∗, for otherwise pj would be oversubscribed in M∗. We note that sr
cannot be assigned to a project that she prefers to pj in any strongly stable matching, for
otherwise some strongly stable pair must have been deleted before (si, pj), as pj must be in
the head of sr’s list when she applied. So sr is either unassigned in M
∗, or sr prefers pj to
M∗(si) or is indifferent between them. Clearly for any combination of lk and pj being full or
undersubscribed in M∗, it follows that (sr, pj) blocks M
∗, a contradiction.
2. Suppose that (si, pj) is deleted (in line 14) because some other student became provisionally
assigned to a project offered by lk during E, causing lk to become full or oversubscribed, so
that si is dominated in Lk. We denote by Ck the set of projects that are full or oversubscribed
in G, which are offered by lk. We denote by Dk the set of projects that are undersubscribed
in G, which are offered by lk. Clearly the projects offered by lk that are provisionally assigned
to a student in G at this point can be partitioned into Ck and Dk. We consider two subcases.
(i) Each student who is provisionally assigned in G to a project in Dk (if any) is also
assigned to that same project in M∗. However, after the deletion of (si, pj), we know
that
∑
pt∈Ck∪Dk
qt =
∑
pt∈Ck
ct +
∑
pt∈Dk
dG(pt) ≥ dk; (2)
i.e., the total quota of projects in Ck ∪Dk is at least the capacity of lk. Now, since pj
has one more assignee in M∗ than it has provisional assignees in G, namely si, then
some other project pj′ ∈ Ck must have fewer than cj′ assignees in M
∗, for otherwise lk
would be oversubscribed in M∗. This implies that there is some student, say sr, such
that lk prefers sr to si and (sr, pj′) ∈ G \M∗. Moreover, sr cannot be assigned to a
project that she prefers to pj′ in M
∗, as explained in (1) above. Hence, (sr, pj′) blocks
M∗, a contradiction.
(ii) Each project in Ck at this point ends up full in M
∗. This implies that there is some
project pj′ ∈ Dk with fewer assignees in M∗ than provisional assignees in G, for other-
wise lk would be oversubscribed in M
∗. Thus pj′ is undersubscribed in M
∗ (since Dk is
the set of undersusbcribed projects offered by lk). Moreover, there is some student, say
sr, such that lk prefers sr to si and (sr, pj′ ) ∈ G \M∗. Following a similar argument in
(i) above, (sr, pj′ ) blocks M
∗, a contradiction.
3. Suppose that (si, pj) is deleted (in line 20) because pj is provisionally assigned to a student
in the critical set Z at some point, and at that point si is in the tail of L
j
k. We refer to
the set of preference lists at that point as the current lists. Let Z ′ be the set of students
in Z who are assigned in M∗ to a project from the head of their current lists, and let P ′
be the set of projects in N (Z) assigned in M∗ to at least one student from the tail of
its current list. We have that pj ∈ P ′, so P ′ 6= ∅. Consider si′ ∈ Z. Now si′ cannot be
assigned in M∗ to a project that she prefers to any project in the head of her current list,
for otherwise some strongly stable pair must have been deleted before (si, pj). Hence, any
student si′ in Z who is provisionally assigned to pj must be in Z
′, otherwise (si′ , pj) would
block M∗. Thus Z ′ 6= ∅. Also Z \ Z ′ 6= ∅, because |Z| −
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ N (Z)} > 0 and
|Z ′|−
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ N (Z)} ≤ |Z
′|−
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ P
′} ≤ 0, since every student in Z ′ is assigned
in M∗ to a project in P ′.
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We now claim that there must be an edge (sr, pj′) in Gr such that sr ∈ Z \ Z ′ and pj′ ∈ P ′.
For otherwise N (Z \ Z ′) ⊆ N (Z) \ P ′, and
|Z \ Z ′| −
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ N (Z \ Z
′)} ≥ |Z \ Z ′| −
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ N (Z) \ P
′}
= |Z| −
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ N (Z)} −
(
|Z ′| −
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ P
′}
)
≥ |Z| −
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ N (Z)},
since |Z ′|−
∑
{q∗j : pj ∈ P
′} ≤ 0. Hence Z \Z ′ has deficiency at least that of Z, contradicting
the fact that Z is the critical set. Thus our claim is established, i.e., there is some student
sr ∈ Z \ Z ′ and some project pj′ ∈ P ′ such that sr is adjacent to pj′ in Gr. Since sr is
either unassigned in M∗ or prefers pj′ to M
∗(sr), and since the lecturer who offers pj′ is
indifferent between sr and at least one student in M
∗(pj′ ), we have that (sr, pj′) blocks M
∗,
a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6. If a pair (si, pj) is deleted in line 29 during the execution of Algorithm SPA-ST-
strong, then (si, pj) does not belong to any strongly stable matching in I.
Proof. Suppose that (si, pj) was deleted in line 29 of the algorithm. Let pj′ be some other
project offered by lk which was replete during an iteration of the inner repeat-until loop and
subsequently ends up undersubscribed at the end of the loop, i.e., pj′ plays the role of pj in
line 23. Suppose that si′ plays the role of sr in line 25, i.e., si′ was the most preferred student
rejected from pj′ according to L
j′
k (possibly si′ = si). Then lk prefers si′ to si or is indifferent
between them, since si plays the role of st at some for loop iteration in line 27. Moreover si′ was
provisionally assigned to pj′ during an iteration of the inner repeat-until loop but (si′ , pj′) /∈ G
at the end of the loop. Thus (si′ , pj′) /∈ M∗, since no strongly stable pair is deleted within the
inner repeat-until loop, as proved in Lemma 5.
Let lz0 = lk, pt0 = pj′ and sq0 = si′ . Again, none of the students who are provisionally
assigned to some project in G can be assigned to any project better than their current assignment
in any strongly stable matching as this would mean a strongly stable pair must have been
deleted before (si, pj), as each student apply to projects in the head of her list. So, either (a)
sq0 is unassigned in M
∗ or sq0 prefers pt0 to M
∗(sq0 ), or (b) sq0 is indifferent between pt0 and
M∗(sq0). If (a) holds, then by the strong stability of M
∗, pt0 is full in M
∗ and lz0 prefers the
worst student/s in M∗(pt0) to sq0 ; for if pt0 is undersubscribed in M
∗ then (sq0 , pt0) blocks M
∗,
since si ∈M∗(lz0) and lz0 prefers sq0 to si or is indifferent between them, a contradiction. If (b)
holds we claim that lz0 prefers sq0 to si. Thus, irrespective of whether M
∗(sq0 ) is offered by lz0
or not, the argument follows from (a), i.e., pt0 is full in M
∗ and lz0 prefers the worst student/s
in M∗(pt0) to sq0 .
Just before the deletion of (si, pj) occurred, pt0 is undersubscribed in G. Since pt0 is full in
M∗, it follows that there exists some student, say sq1 , such that (sq1 , pt0) ∈ M
∗ \ G. We note
that lz0 prefers sq1 to sq0 . Let pt1 = pt0 . Since (si, pj) is the first strongly stable pair to be
deleted, sq1 is provisionally assigned in G to a project pt2 such that sq1 prefers pt2 to pt1 . For
otherwise, as students apply to projects in the head of their list, that would mean (sq1 , pt1) must
have been deleted during an iteration of the inner repeat-until loop, a contradiction. We note
that pt2 6= pt1 , since (sq1 , pt2) ∈ G and (sq1 , pt1) /∈ G. Let lz1 be the lecturer who offers pt2 . By
the strong stability of M∗, it follows that either
(i) pt2 is full in M
∗ and lz1 prefers the worst student/s in M
∗(pt2) to sq1 , or
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(ii) pt2 is undersubscribed in M
∗, lz1 is full in M
∗, sq1 /∈ M
∗(lz1) and lz1 prefer the worst
student/s in M∗(lz1) to sq1 .
Otherwise (sq1 , pt2) blocks M
∗. In case (i), there exists some student sq2 ∈M
∗(pt2) \G(pt2).
Let pt3 = pt2 . In case (ii), there exists some student sq2 ∈ M
∗(lz1) \ G(lz1). We note that lz1
prefers sq2 to sq1 . Now, suppose M
∗(sq2) = pt3 (possibly pt3 = pt2). It is clear that sq2 6= sq1 .
Applying similar reasoning as for sq1 , sq2 is assigned in G to a project pt4 such that sq2 prefers pt4
to pt3 . Let lz2 be the lecturer who offers pt4 . We are identifying a sequence 〈sqi 〉i≥0 of students,
a sequence 〈pti〉i≥0 of projects, and a sequence 〈lzi〉i≥0 of lecturers, such that, for each i ≥ 1
1. sqi prefers pt2i to pt2i−1 ,
2. (sqi , pt2i) ∈ G and (sqi , pt2i−1) ∈M
∗,
3. lzi prefers sqi+1 to sqi ; also, lzi offers both pt2i and pt2i+1 (possibly pt2i = pt2i+1).
First we claim that for each new project that we identify, pt2i 6= pt2i−1 for i ≥ 1. Suppose
pt2i = pt2i−1 for some i ≥ 1. From above sqi was identified by lzi−1 such that (sqi , pt2i−1) ∈M
∗\G.
Moreover (sqi , pt2i) ∈ G. Hence we reach a contradiction. Clearly, for each student sqi for i ≥ 1
we identify, sqi must be assigned to distinct projects in G and in M
∗.
Next we claim that for each new student sqi that we identify, sqi 6= sqt for 1 ≤ t < i. We
prove this by induction on i. For the base case, clearly sq2 6= sq1 . We assume that the claim holds
for some i ≥ 1, i.e., the sequence sq1 , sq2 , . . . , sqi consists of distinct students. We show that the
claim holds for i + 1, i.e, the sequence sq1 , sq2 , . . . , sqi , sqi+1 also consists of distinct students.
Clearly sqi+1 6= sqi since lzi prefers sqi+1 to sqi . Thus, it suffices to show that sqi+1 6= sqj for
1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1. Now, suppose sqi+1 = sqj for 1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1. This implies that sqj was identified
by lzi and clearly lzi prefers sqj to sqj−1 . Now since sqi+1 was also identified by lzi to avoid
the blocking pair (sqi , pt2i ) in M
∗, it follows that either (i) pt2i is full in M
∗, or (ii) pt2i is
undersubscribed in M∗ and lzi is full in M
∗. We consider each cases further as follows.
(i) If pt2i is full in M
∗, we know that (sqi , pt2i) ∈ G \M
∗. Moreover sqj was identified by lzi+1
because of case (i). Furthermore (sqj−1 , pt2i) ∈ G \M
∗. In this case, pt2i+1 = pt2i and we
have that
(sqi , pt2i+1) ∈ G \M
∗ and (sqi+1 , pt2i+1) ∈M
∗ \G,
(sqj−1 , pt2i+1) ∈ G \M
∗ and (sqj , pt2i+1) ∈M
∗ \G.
By the inductive hypothesis, the sequence sq1 , sq2 , . . . , sqj−1 , sqj , . . . , sqi consists of distinct
students. This implies that sqi 6= sqj−1 . Thus since pt2i+1 is full in M
∗, lzi should have been
able to identify distinct students sqj and sqi+1 to avoid the blocking pairs (sqj−1 , pt2i+1) and
(sqi , pt2i+1) respectively in M
∗, a contradiction.
(ii) pt2i is undersubscribed in M
∗ and lzi is full in M
∗. Similarly as in case (i) above, we have
that
sqi ∈ G(lzi) \M
∗(lzi) and sqi+1 ∈M
∗(lzi) \G(lzi),
sqj−1 ∈ G(lzi) \M
∗(lzi) and sqj ∈M
∗(lzi) \G(lzi).
Since sqi 6= sqj−1 and lzi is full inM
∗, lzi should have been able to identify distinct students
sqj and sqi+1 corresponding to students sqj−1 and sqi respectively, a contradiction.
This completes the induction step. As the sequence of distinct students and projects is infinite,
we reach an immediate contradiction. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 7. If a pair (si, pj) is deleted in line 36 during the execution of Algorithm SPA-ST-
strong, then (si, pj) does not belong to any strongly stable matching in I.
Proof. Suppose that (si, pj) is the first strongly stable pair to be deleted during an arbitrary
execution E of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong. Then by Lemmas 5 and 6, (si, pj) was deleted in
line 36. Let lk be the lecturer who offers pj and let M
∗ be some strongly stable matching in
which si is assigned to pj. Let G be the provisional assignment graph. At this point in the
algorithm where the deletion of (si, pj) occured, si is adjacent to some other project pj′ ∈ G
via a bound edge, where pj′ is offered by lk′ (note that lk 6= lk′). By the definition of a bound
edge, it follows that either pj′ is not oversubscribed in G or lk′ prefers si to some student in
G(pj′ ) (or both). Also, either (si, pj′ ) is not a lower rank edge or lk′ prefers si to some student
in G(lk′) (or both).
Let lz0 = lk′ , pt0 = pj′ and sq0 = si. We note that sq0 is indifferent between pj and pt0 . Now,
since (sq0 , pt0) ∈ G \M
∗, by the strong stabiity of M∗, either (i) or (ii) holds as follows:
(i) pt0 is full in M
∗ and lz0 prefers the worst student/s in M
∗(pt0) to sq0 or is indifferent
between them;
(ii) pt0 is undersubscribed inM
∗, lz0 is full inM
∗ and lz0 prefers the worst students inM
∗(lz0)
to sq0 or is indifferent between them.
Otherwise (sq0 , pt0) blocks M
∗. In case (i), since sq0 is bound to pt0 in G and since (sq0 , pt0) ∈
G \M∗, there exists some student sq1 ∈M
∗(pt0) \G(pt0). Let pt1 = pt0 . In case (ii), since sq0 is
assigned in G to a project offered by lz0 (i.e., pt0) via a bound edge, and since sq0 is not assigned
to lz0 in M
∗, there exists some student sq1 ∈ M
∗(lz0) \ G(lz0). We note that lz0 either prefers
sq1 to sq0 or is indifferent between them; clearly sq1 6= sq0 .
Now, suppose M∗(sq1) = pt1 (possibly pt1 = pt0). Since (sq0 , pj) is the first strongly stable
pair to be deleted, sq1 is provisionally assigned in G to a project pt2 such that sq1 prefers pt2 to
pt1 . For otherwise, as students apply to projects in the head of their list and since (sq1 , pt1) /∈ G,
that would mean (sq1 , pt1) must have been deleted during an iteration of the repeat-until
loop, a contradiction. We note that pt2 6= pt1 , since (sq1 , pt2) ∈ G and (sq1 , pt1) /∈ G. Let lz1 be
the lecturer who offers pt2 . Again by the strong stability ofM
∗, either (i) or (ii) holds as follows:
(i) pt2 is full in M
∗ and lz1 prefers the worst student/s in M
∗(pt2) to sq1 ;
(ii) pt2 is undersubscribed inM
∗, lz1 is full inM
∗ and lz1 prefers the worst students inM
∗(lz1)
to sq1 .
Otherwise (sq1 , pt2) blocks M
∗. In case (i), there exists some student sq2 ∈M
∗(pt2) \G(pt2).
Let pt3 = pt2 . In case (ii), there exists some student sq2 ∈ M
∗(lz1) \ G(lz1). We note that
lz1 prefers sq2 to sq1 ; again it is clear that sq2 6= sq1 . Now, suppose M
∗(sq2) = pt3 (possibly
pt3 = pt2). Applying similar reasoning as for sq1 , sq2 is provisionally assigned in G to a project
pt4 such that sq2 prefers pt4 to pt3 . Let lz2 be the lecturer who offers pt4 . We are identifying a
sequence 〈sqi〉i≥0 of students, a sequence 〈pti〉i≥0 of projects, and a sequence 〈lzi〉i≥0 of lecturers,
such that, for each i ≥ 1
1. sqi prefers pt2i to pt2i−1 ,
2. (sqi , pt2i) ∈ G and (sqi , pt2i−1) ∈M
∗,
3. lzi prefers sqi+1 to sqi ; also, lzi offers both pt2i and pt2i+1 (possibly pt2i = pt2i+1).
Following a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 6, we can identify an infinite sequence
of distinct students and projects, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Lemmas 5, 6 and 7 immediately give rise to Lemma 4. The next two lemmas will be used as
a tool in the proof of the remaining lemmas.
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Lemma 8. Every student who is assigned to a project (intuitively a lecturer) in the final provi-
sional assignment graph G must be assigned in any feasible matching M .
Proof. Suppose si is a student who is provisionally assigned to some project in G, but si is not
assigned in a feasible matching M , then si must be in the critical set Z, and hence Z 6= ∅, a
contradiction. ⊓⊔
Lemma 9. Let M be a feasible matching in the final provisional assignment graph G and let
M∗ be any strongly stable matching. Let lk be an arbitrary lecturer; (i) if lk is undersubscribed
in M∗ then every student who is assigned to lk in M is also assigned to lk in M
∗, and (ii) if lk
is undersubscribed in M then lk has the same number of assignees in M
∗ as in M .
Proof. Let lk be an arbitrary lecturer. First, we show that (i) holds. Suppose otherwise, then
there exists a student, say si, such that si ∈M(lk)\M∗(lk). Moreover, there exists some project
pj ∈ Pk such that si ∈ M(pj) \M
∗(pj). By Lemma 4, si cannot be assigned to a project that
she prefers to pj in M
∗. Also, by the strong stability of M∗, pj is full in M
∗ and lk prefers the
worst student/s in M∗(pj) to si.
Let lz0 = lk, pt0 = pj , and sq0 = si. As pt0 is full inM
∗ and no project is oversubscribed inM ,
there exists some student sq1 ∈M
∗(pt0) \M(pt0) such that lz0 prefers sq1 to sq0 . Let pt1 = pt0 .
By Lemma 4, sq1 is assigned in M to a project pt2 such that sq1 prefers pt2 to pt1 . We note that
sq1 cannot be indifferent between pt2 and pt1 ; for otherwise, as students apply to projects in the
head of their list, since (sq1 , pt1) /∈M , that would mean (sq1 , pt1) must have been deleted during
the algorithm’s execution, contradicting Lemma 4. It follows that sq1 ∈ M(pt2) \M
∗(pt2). Let
lz1 be the lecturer who offers pt2 . By the strong stability of M
∗, either
(i) pt2 is full in M
∗ and lz1 prefers the worst student/s in M
∗(pt2) to sq1 , or
(ii) pt2 is undersubscribed in M
∗, lz1 is full in M
∗, sq1 /∈ M
∗(lz1) and lz1 prefers the worst
student/s in M∗(lz1) to sq1 .
Otherwise (sq1 , pt2) blocksM
∗. In case (i), there exists some student sq2 ∈M
∗(pt2)\M(pt2).
Let pt3 = pt2 . In case (ii), there exists some student sq2 ∈ M
∗(lz1) \M(lz1). We note that lz1
prefers sq2 to sq1 . Now, suppose M
∗(sq2) = pt3 (possibly pt3 = pt2). It is clear that sq2 6= sq1 .
Applying similar reasoning as for sq1 , student sq2 is assigned in M to a project pt4 such that sq2
prefers pt4 to pt3 . Let lz2 be the lecturer who offers pt4 . We are identifying a sequence 〈sqi〉i≥0
of students, a sequence 〈pti〉i≥0 of projects, and a sequence 〈lzi〉i≥0 of lecturers, such that, for
each i ≥ 1
1. sqi prefers pt2i to pt2i−1 ,
2. (sqi , pt2i) ∈ G and (sqi , pt2i−1) ∈M
∗,
3. lzi prefers sqi+1 to sqi ; also, lzi offers both pt2i and pt2i+1 (possibly pt2i = pt2i+1).
Following a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 6, we can identify an infinite sequence
of distinct students and projects, a contradiction. Hence, if lk is undersubscribed in M
∗ then
every student who is assigned to lk in M is also assigned to lk in M
∗.
Next, we show that (ii) holds. By the first claim, any lecturer who is full in M is also full in
M∗, and any lecturer who is undersubscribed in M has as many assignees in M∗ as she has in
M . Hence
∑
lk∈L
|M(lk)| ≤
∑
lk∈L
|M∗(lk)| . (3)
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Let S1 and S2 denote the set of students who are assigned to a project inM andM
∗ respectively.
By Lemma 8, each student who is provisionally assigned to a project in the final provisional
assignment graph G must be assigned to a project in M . Moreover, any student who is not
provisionally assigned to a project in G must have an empty list. It follows that these students
are unassigned inM∗, since Lemma 4 guarantees that no strongly stable pairs are deleted. Thus
|S2| ≤ |S1|. Further, we have that
∑
lk∈L
|M∗(lk)| = |S2| ≤ |S1| =
∑
lk∈L
|M(lk)|, (4)
From Inequality 3 and 4, it follows that |M(lk)| = |M∗(lk)| for each lk ∈ L. ⊓⊔
The next three lemmas deal with the case that Algorithm SPA-ST-strong reports the non-
existence of a strongly stable matching in I.
Lemma 10. Let M be a feasible matching in the final provisional assignment graph G. Suppose
that (a) some non-replete lecturer lk has fewer assignees in M than provisional assignees in G,
or (b) some replete lecturer is not full in M . Then I admits no strongly stable matching.
Proof. Suppose that M∗ is a strongly stable matching for the instance. By Lemma 8, each
student who is provisionally assigned to a project in G must be assigned to a project in M .
Moreover, any student who is not provisionally assigned to a project in G must have an empty
list. It follows that these students are unassigned in M∗, since Lemma 4 guarantees that no
strongly stable pairs are deleted. Thus |M∗| ≤ |M |.
Suppose that condition (a) is satisfied. Then some non-replete lecturer lk′ satisfies |M(lk′)| <
dG(lk′), where dG(lk′ ) is the number of students provisionally assigned in G to a project offered
by lk′ . As lk′ is non-replete, it follows that dG(lk′) < dk′ . Now |M(lk)| ≤ min{dk, dG(lk)} for all
lk ∈ L. Hence
|M | =
∑
lk∈L
|M(lk)| <
∑
lk∈L
min{dk, dG(lk)} . (5)
Now, suppose that |M∗(lk)| ≥ min{dk, dG(lk)} for all lk ∈ L. Then |M∗| > |M | by 5,
a contradiction. Hence |M∗(lk)| < min{dk, dG(lk)} for some lk ∈ L. This implies that lk is
undersubcribed in M∗. Moreover, lk has fewer assignees in M
∗ than provisional assignees in G.
Thus there exists some student si who is provisionally assigned to lk in G but not in M
∗. It
follows that there exists some project pj ∈ Pk such that (si, pj) ∈ G \M∗. By Lemma 4, si is
not assigned to a project that she prefers to pj in M
∗. Also, by the strong stability of M∗, pj
is full in M∗ and lk prefers the worst student/s in M
∗(pj) to si; for if pj is undersubscribed in
M∗ then (si, pj) blocks M
∗, a contradiction. Since pj is full inM
∗ with students that are better
than si in L
j
k and (si, pj) ∈ G \M
∗, then there is some student, say si′ , such that lk prefers si′
to si and (si′ , pj) ∈M
∗ \G. For if all the students assigned to pj in M
∗ are also assigned to pj
in G, then si would be dominated in L
j
k and thus (si, pj) would have been deleted in G.
Let lz0 = lk, pt0 = pt1 = pj , sq0 = si, sq1 = si′ . Again, by Lemma 4, sq1 is provisionally
assigned in G to a project pt2 such that sq1 prefers pt2 to pt1 . For otherwise, as students apply
to projects in the head of their list, since (sq1 , pt1) /∈ G, that would mean (sq1 , pt1) must have
been deleted during the algorithm’s execution, a contradiction. We note that pt2 6= pt1 , since
(sq1 , pt2) ∈ G and (sq1 , pt1) /∈ G. Let lz1 be the lecturer who offers pt2 . By the strong stability
of M∗, either
(i) pt2 is full in M
∗ and lz1 prefers the worst student/s in M
∗(pt2) to sq1 , or
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(ii) pt2 is undersubscribed in M
∗, lz1 is full in M
∗, sq1 /∈ M
∗(lz1) and lz1 prefers the worst
student/s in M∗(lz1) to sq1 .
Otherwise (sq1 , pt2) blocks M
∗. In case (i), there exists some student sq2 ∈M
∗(pt2) \G(pt2).
Let pt3 = pt2 . In case (ii), there exists some student sq2 ∈ M
∗(lz1) \ G(lz1). We note that lz1
prefers sq2 to sq1 . Now, suppose M
∗(sq2) = pt3 (possibly pt3 = pt2). It is clear that sq2 6= sq1 .
Applying similar reasoning as for sq1 , student sq2 is assigned in G to a project pt4 such that sq2
prefers pt4 to pt3 . Let lz2 be the lecturer who offers pt4 . We are identifying a sequence 〈sqi〉i≥0
of students, a sequence 〈pti〉i≥0 of projects, and a sequence 〈lzi〉i≥0 of lecturers, such that, for
each i ≥ 1
1. sqi prefers pt2i to pt2i−1 ,
2. (sqi , pt2i) ∈ G and (sqi , pt2i−1) ∈M
∗,
3. lzi prefers sqi+1 to sqi ; also, lzi offers both pt2i and pt2i+1 (possibly pt2i = pt2i+1).
Following a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 6, we can identify an infinite sequence
of distinct students and projects, a contradiction.
Now suppose condition (b) is satisfied, i.e., some replete lecturer is not full in M . Let L1
and L2 be the set of replete and non-replete lecturers respectively. Then some lk′′ ∈ L1 satisfies
|M(lk′′)| < dk′′ . Condition (a) cannot be satisfied, for otherwise the first part of the proof shows
that M∗ does not exist. Hence |M(lk)| = dG(lk) < dk for all lk ∈ L2. Now |M(lk)| ≤ dk for all
lk ∈ L1. Hence
|M | =
∑
lk∈L1
|M(lk)|+
∑
lk∈L2
|M(lk)| <
∑
lk∈L1
dk +
∑
lk∈L2
dG(lk) . (6)
Now suppose that |M∗(lk)| = dk for all lk ∈ L1, and |M∗(lk)| ≥ dG(lk) for all lk ∈ L2. Then
|M∗| > |M | by 6, a contradiction. Hence either (i) |M∗(lk′)| < dk′ for some lk′ ∈ L1, or (ii)
|M∗(lk′)| < dG(lk′) for some lk′ ∈ L2. In case (ii), we reach a similar contradiction to that
arrived at for condition (a). In case (i), we have that lk′ is undersubscribed in M
∗. As lk′ is
replete, there exists some student si who was provisionally assigned to lk′ during the algorithm’s
execution, but si is not assigned to lk′ in M
∗. Moreover, there exists some project pj ∈ Pk′ such
that (si, pj) /∈ M∗ By Lemma 4, si is not assigned to a project in M∗ that she prefers to pj .
Following a similar argument as above, we can identify a sequence of distinct students and
projects, and as this sequence is infinite, we reach a contradiction. Thus I admits no strongly
stable matching. ⊓⊔
Lemma 11. Suppose that in the final provisional assignment graph G, a student is bound to
two or more projects that are offered by different lecturers. Then I admits no strongly stable
matching.
Proof. Suppose that a strongly stable matching exists for the instance. Let M be a feasible
matching in the final provisional assignment graph G. Denote by L1 and L2 the set of replete
and non-replete lecturers respectively.
Denote by S1 the set of students who are bound to one or more projects in G, and by S2 the
other students who are provisionally assigned to one or more projects in G. By Lemma 8,
|M | = |S1|+ |S2| . (7)
Also,
|M | =
∑
lk∈L1
|M(lk)|+
∑
lk∈L2
|M(lk)| . (8)
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Moreover, we have that
∑
lk∈L1
|M(lk)|+
∑
lk∈L2
|M(lk)| =
∑
lk∈L1
dk +
∑
lk∈L2
dG(lk); (9)
for otherwise, no strongly stable matching exists by Lemma 10. Now, if some student is bound
to more than one project offered by different lecturers, by considering how the lecturers’ quotas
are reduced when the students in S1 are removed in forming Gr from G, it follows that
∑
lk∈L1
(dk − q
∗
k) +
∑
lk∈L2
(dG(lk)− q
∗
k) ≥
∑
lk∈L1
(dk − q
∗
k) +
∑
lk∈L2
(min{dG(lk), αk} − q
∗
k)
=
∑
lk∈L1
(qk − q
∗
k) +
∑
lk∈L2
(qk − q
∗
k)
=
∑
lk∈L1∪L2
(qk − q
∗
k)
> |S1|, (10)
where
∑
lk∈L1
(dk − q∗k) and
∑
lk∈L2
(min{dG(lk), αk} − q∗k) is the number of students that are
bound to at least one project offered by a lecturer in L1 and L2 respectively. By substituting
Equality 9 into Inequality 10, we obtain the following
∑
lk∈L1
|M(lk)| −
∑
lk∈L1
q∗k +
∑
lk∈L2
|M(lk)| −
∑
lk∈L2
q∗k > |S1| . (11)
Combining 7 and 8 into 11, we have
|S1|+ |S2| −
∑
lk∈L1
q∗k −
∑
lk∈L2
q∗k > |S1|,
∑
lk∈L1∪L2
q∗k < |S2| . (12)
Since the total revised quota of lecturers in L1 ∪ L2 whose projects are provisionally assigned
to a student in Gr is strictly less than the number of students in S2, the preceding inequality
suffices to establish that the critical set is non-empty, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Lemma 12. Let M be a feasible matching in the final provisional assignment graph G. Suppose
that the pair (si, pj), where pj is offered by lk, was deleted during the algorithm’s execution.
Suppose further that for any pj′ ∈ Pk such that si is indifferent between pj and pj′ , (si, pj′) /∈M .
Finally, suppose each of pj and lk is undersubscribed in M . Then I admits no strongly stable
matching.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that there exists a strongly stable matching M∗ in I. Let
(si, pj) be a pair that was deleted during an arbitrary execution E of the algorithm. This implies
that (si, pj) /∈M∗ by Lemma 4. LetM be the feasible matching at the termination of E. By the
hypothesis of the lemma, lk is undersubscribed in M . This implies that lk is undersubscribed in
M∗, as proved in Lemma 9. Since pj is offered by lk, and pj is undersubscribed in M , it follows
from the proof of [24, Lemma 5] that pj is undersubscribed in M
∗. Further, by the hypothesis
of the lemma, either si is unassigned in M , or si prefers pj to M(si) or is indifferent between
them, where M(si) is not offered by lk. By Lemma 4, this is true for si in M
∗. Hence (si, pj)
blocks M∗, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
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The next lemma shows that the feasible matchingM may be used to determine the existence,
or otherwise, of a strongly stable matching in I.
Lemma 13. Let M be a feasible matching in the final provisional assignment graph G. If M is
not strongly stable then there is no strongly stable matching for the instance.
Proof. Suppose that M is not strongly stable. Let (si, pj) be a blocking pair for M , and let lk
be the lecturer who offers pj. We consider two cases.
1. Suppose si is unassigned in M or prefers pj to M(si). Then (si, pj) has been deleted.
Suppose (si, pj) was deleted as a result of pj being full or oversubscribed in line 8. Then pj is
replete. Suppose firstly that pj ends up full in M , then (si, pj) cannot block M irrespective
of whether lk is undersubscribed or full in M , since lk prefers the worst assigned student/s
in M(pj) to si. Thus pj is not full in M . As pj was previously full, each pair (st, pu), for
each st that is no better than si at the tail of Lk and each pu ∈ Pk ∩ At, would have been
deleted in line 29. Thus if lk is full in M , then (si, pj) does not block M . Now suppose lk is
undersubscribed inM . If lk was full at some point during the algorithm’s execution, then no
strongly stable matching exists, by Lemma 10. Thus lk was never full during the algorithm’s
execution. This implies that lk is non-replete. To recap, we have that pj is a replete project
that is not full in M , which is offered by a non-replete lecturer. Moreover, since (si, pj) has
been deleted, no strongly stable matching exists, by Lemma 12. Thus (si, pj) was not deleted
because pj became replete in line 8.
Now, suppose (si, pj) was deleted as a result of lk being full or oversubscribed in line 11.
Then (si, pj) could only block M if lk ends up undersubscribed in M . If this is the case,
then no strongly stable matching exists for the instance, by Lemma 10.
Next, suppose (si, pj) was deleted because pj was a neighbour of some student si′ ∈ Z
at a point when si was in the tail of L
j
k. Denote by Z
′ the set of students in Z who are
provisionally assigned to pj in Gr . Suppose pj is non-replete, it follows that 0 < |Z ′| ≤ q∗j .
Let Z ′′ = Z \ Z ′. Then N (Z ′′) ⊆ N (Z) \ {pj}, so that
∑
pj′∈N (Z
′′)
q∗j′ ≤

 ∑
pj′∈N (Z)
q∗j′

− q∗j .
Hence
δ(Z ′′) = |Z ′′| −
∑
pj′∈N (Z
′′)
q∗j′
= |Z| − |Z ′| −
∑
pj′∈N (Z
′′)
q∗j′
≥ |Z| − |Z ′| −

 ∑
pj′∈N (Z)
q∗j′

+ q∗j
= |Z|+ q∗j − |Z
′| −
∑
pj′∈N (Z)
q∗j′
≥ |Z| −
∑
pj′∈N (Z)
q∗j′
= δ(Z)
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If δ(Z ′′) > δ(Z), then we reach a contradiction to the fact Z is maximally deficient; hence
δ(Z ′′) = δ(Z). Moreover, Z ′′ ⊂ Z, contradicting the minimality of Z. Now, suppose pj
is replete. The argument that no strongly stable matchings exists follows from the first
paragraph.
Next, suppose (si, pj) was deleted (at line 29) because some other project pj′ offered by lk is
replete and subsequently becomes undersubscribed at line 23. Then lk must have identified
her most preferred student, say sr, rejected from pj′ such that si is at the tail of Lk and
si is no better than sr in Lk. Moreover, every project offered by lk that si finds acceptable
would have been deleted from si’s preference list at the for loop iteration in line 29. Thus if
pj ends up full in M , then (si, pj) does not block M . Suppose pj ends up undersubscribed
in M . If lk is full in M , then (si, pj) does not block M , since si /∈M(lk) and lk prefers the
worst student/s in M(lk) to si. Suppose lk is undersubscribed in M . Again, if lk is replete,
then no strongly stable matching exists, by Lemma 10. Thus lk is non-replete. Since (si, pj)
has been deleted, no strongly stable matching exists, by Lemma 12.
2. Suppose si is indifferent between pj and M(si). First, suppose pj is undersubscribed in M .
By the strong stability definition, M(si) is not offered by lk. Suppose lk is undersubscribed
in M . If lk is replete, then by Lemma 10, no strongly stable matching exists. Hence lk is
non-replete. First suppose (si, pj) ∈ G, since si /∈ M(lk), this implies that lk has fewer
assignees in M than provisional assignees in G. Thus no strongly stable matching exists by
Lemma 10. Now suppose (si, pj) /∈ G. Then (si, pj) has been deleted. If pj is replete, then
no strongly stable matching exists by Lemma 12. Hence pj is non-replete. To recap, (si, pj)
has been deleted, and each of pj and lk is non-replete. There are two points in this algorithm
where this deletion could have happened; (i) if pj was a neighbour of some student si′ ∈ Z
at a point when si was in the tail of L
j
k, or (ii) at line 29 – because some other project pj′
offered by lk is replete and subsequently becomes undersubscribed at line 23. In any of the
cases, the argument that no strongly stable matching exists follows from (1) above. Finally,
suppose pj is full in M . Then (si, pj) cannot block M irrespective of whether lk is full or
undersubscribed inM , since the worst student/s inM(pj) are either better or no worse than
si, according to L
j
k.
Since (si, pj) is an arbitrary pair, this implies that M admits no blocking pair. Hence I
admits no strongly stable matching. ⊓⊔
Lemma 14. Algorithm SPA-ST-strong may be implemented to run in O(m2) time, where m
is the total length of the students’ preference lists.
Proof. It is clear that the work done in the inner repeat-until loop other than in finding the
maximum cardinality matchings and critical sets is bounded by a constant times the number
of deleted pairs, and so is O(m) (where m is the total length of the students’ preference lists).
We remark that the total amount of work done outside the inner repeat-until loop (i.e., in
deleting pairs when a replete project ends up undersubscribed in line 23) is bounded by the
total length of the students’ preference lists, and so is O(m). During each iteration of the inner
repeat-until loop of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong, we need to form the reduced assignment
graph Gr, which takes O(m) time. Further, we need to search for a maximum matching in Gr,
which allows us to use Lemma 3 to find the critical set. Next we show how we can bound the
total amount of work done in finding the maximum matchings.
Suppose that Algorithm SPA-ST-strong finds a maximum matching M
(i)
r in the reduced
assignment graph G
(i)
r at the ith iteration of the inner repeat-until loop. Suppose also that,
during the ith iteration in this loop, xi pairs are deleted because they involve students in the
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critical set Z(i), or students tied with them in the tail of a project in N (Z(i)). Suppose further
that in the (i+ 1)th iteration, yi pairs are deleted before the reduced assignment graph G
(i+1)
r
is formed. Note that any edge in G
(i)
r which is not one of these xi + yi deleted pairs must be in
G
(i+1)
r , since an edge in the provisional assignment graph cannot change state from unbound to
bound. In particular, at least |M
(i)
r | − xi − yi edges of M
(i)
r remain in G
(i+1)
r at the (i + 1)th
iteration. Hence we can start from these edges in that iteration and find a maximum matching
M
(i+1)
r in O(min{nm, (xi + yi + zi)m}) time, where zi is the number of edges in G
(i+1)
r which
were not in G
(i)
r .
Suppose that a total of s iterations of the inner repeat-until loop are carried out, and
that in t of these, min{nm, (xi + yi + zi)m}) = nm. Then the time complexity of maximum
matching operations, taken over the entire execution of the algorithm, is O(min{n,
∑
cj}m +
tnm +m
∑
(xi + yi + zi)) where the first term is for the maximum matching computation in
the first iteration, and the sum in the third term is over the appropriate s − t − 1 values of
i. We note that
∑s
i=1(xi + yi + zi) ≤ 2m (since each of the total number of deletions and
provisional assignments is bounded by the total length of the students’ preference lists), and
since xi + yi + zi ≥ n for the appropriate t values of i, it follows that
tnm+m
∑
(xi + yi + zi) ≤ m
s∑
i=1
(xi + yi + zi) ≤ 2m
2.
Thus
m
∑
(xi + yi + zi) ≤ 2m
2 − tnm.
At the termination of the outer repeat-until loop, a feasible matching is constructed by
taking the final maximum matching and combining it with the bound (student, project) pairs
in the final provisional assignment graph. This operation is clearly bounded by the number of
bound pairs, hence is O(m). It follows that the overall complexity of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong
is O(m +min{n,
∑
cj}m +2m2) = O(m2).
We remark that the problem of finding a maximum matching in Gr is also called the Upper
Degree Constrained Subgraph problem (UDCS) [8]. An instance of Gr can be viewed as an instance
of UDCS, except that students have no explicit preferences in the UDCS case. Using Gabow’s UDCS
algorithm [8], we can find a maximum matching in Gr in time O(|Er |
√∑
q∗j ). However, it is
not clear how this algorithm can be used to improve the overall running time of Algorithm
SPA-ST-strong. ⊓⊔
The following theorem collects together Lemmas 4-14 and establishes the correctness of Algorithm
SPA-ST-strong.
Theorem 1. For a given instance I of spa-st, Algorithm SPA-ST-strong determines in O(m2)
time whether or not a strongly stable matching exists in I. If such a matching does exist, all pos-
sible executions of the algorithm find one in which each assigned student is assigned at least as
good a project as she could obtain in any strongly stable matching, and each unassigned student
is unassigned in every strongly stable matchings.
Given the optimality property established by Theorem 1, we define the strongly stable
matching found by Algorithm SPA-ST-strong to be student-optimal. For example, in the spa-
st instance illustrated in Fig. 3 (Page 13), the student-optimal strongly stable matching is
M = {(s1, p6), (s2, p2), (s4, p5), (s5, p3), (s6, p4), (s7, p1), (s8, p1)}.
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5 Conclusion
We leave open the formulation of a lecturer-oriented counterpart to Algorithm SPA-ST-strong.
From an experimental perspective, an interesting direction would be to carry out an empirical
analysis of Algorithm SPA-ST-strong, to investigate how various parameters (e.g., the density
and position of ties in the preference lists, the length of the preference lists, or the popularity of
some projects) affect the existence of a strongly stable matching, based on randomly generated
and/or real instances of spa-st.
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